Reflections on the Swedish Security Debate

 25.04.2008

Autorid: Riina Kaljurand ja Julian Tupay

Mr Urban Ahlin, a leading social democrat in Sweden, visited the International Centre for Defence Studies in Tallinn on the 1st of April to talk about the role of Sweden in world security. Mr Ahlin is a veteran of Swedish politics and a master of its rhetoric. He has been a member of the Riksdag (the Swedish Parliament) since 1994. Unlike most of his colleagues, who prefer to remain politically correct, he is said to be more outspoken and courageous. It would have been too much to expect revolutionary statements, but hopes were rather high because – to be honest – it is very seldom that you hear a heated debate about Swedish security concerns. Our only wish was that not everything that was to be said would be a 1st April joke.

Mr Ahlin started with the provocative statement that, “Swedes are the prisoners of their own success. In security terms, Swedish society is still stuck in Cold War thinking.”

Sweden’s current perspective on international security and its role in it is largely shaped by its post-WWII history. During the Cold War, Sweden remained neutral – a fact that made it much sought after as peace-keeper, mediator and host for international negotiations, which in turn gave Sweden much prestige. Another positive side of Sweden’s neutrality was its consequent ability to speak up against all injustice, be it Soviet or US in origin.

The Cold War has thus engraved on Swedish minds the idea that neutrality is the way to decency and prosperity. The end of the Cold War has thrown Sweden into an identity crisis, for suddenly their former neutrality does not distinguish them from other nations and the demand for Swedish support has dropped off dramatically. This trend is exacerbated by the fact that many of the functions formerly carried out by the Swedes are now being carried out by NATO.

Due to the Swedish trust in non-alignment, joining NATO will not be an option for the foreseeable future (the speaker hinted that it would never happen). But more than that, it is a question of the transformation of Swedish society itself and its view of the security situation in its closest neighbourhood; for Swedes, it is a question about the role of NATO and the ongoing NATO transformation. What will happen to NATO, they ask?!

The same Cold War paradigm can be perceived in Sweden’s relationship with other organisations, such as the EU. A high degree of unionism is nicely mixed with a strong sense of protectionism. The official line reflects enthusiastic support for EU enlargement and the development of a strong ESDP. The first desire stems from the wish to bring prosperity and justice to other parts of the world – something the Swedes prided themselves on during the Cold War. The wish for a stronger ESDP is the result of a desire to have a more active role in international security again without being a member of NATO. On the other hand, since the Swedes were made to believe that their special position during the Cold War made them better off than everyone else, the population now fears that an ever wider EU will only mean redistributing their wealth to less developed countries. The gap between the view of the Swedish people and the Swedish Government’s official stand seems to be increasing as far as the Swedish security identity and the role of Sweden in world security are concerned.

Fair enough: developing the capacities of the ESDP will certainly pay off in the future, especially when the EU and NATO manage to co-ordinate a fair burden-sharing deal. When it comes to the role of Sweden in all this, nothing new was actually said at the seminar. It was refreshing to hear a note of self-criticism and ironic self-awareness in Mr Ahlin’s talk, but whether this new rhetoric is purely aimed at getting re-elected, or whether it is an attempt to lift the Swedish security and defence policy debate to another level remains to be seen. So, let’s be Swedes – let’s wait and see!

postitas: RKK/ICDS blog